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THE TORT LIABILITY OF A CITY FOR A MUNICIPAL
AIRPORT
In order to meet the needs of advancing air transportation,
cities have found it necessary to acquire and maintain
municipal airports. As a consequence the following question
has arisen: To what extent are cities liable for negligence in the
operation and maintenance of such enterprises? The city's
liability depends upon whether the maintenance of a municipal
airport is a proprietary or governmental function. If it is a
governmental function, there is no liability for negligence. If,
however, the enterprise is proprietary, the city is subject to the
same liability as any private person or corporation. There seems
to be no adequate test for separating governmental and pro-
prietary functions. The cases seem to rest on analogies rather
than rules. Perhaps the best way to determine whether this
new business entered into by the city is proprietary or govern-
mental is to consider the factors involved.
The first factor to be considered is the authority under
which these airports are established. By 1944 every state in the
union had some legislation authorizing public bodies to acquire
and maintain public airports.1 Some cities, however, have
established airports under the general authority to acquire pub-
lic utilities.2  Acquisition under the latter authority would
seem to place airports in the same category as waterworks, elec-
tric plants, etc. which are undoubtedly proprietary in character.
Alabama did exactly that in holding a city liable for draining
off surface water from the airport onto adjacent lands.3
The second factor concerns the receipt of revenue by the
city from this enterprise. This is, of course, dependent upon the
manner in which the airport is operated. But it is hard to con-
ceive of any plan by which the city would not receive some
pecuniary benefit. The cases are consistent in holding that it
is not necessary that the city realize a profit on the operation
I RH , AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS (1944) 20.
'State ex rel City of Lincoln v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N. W.
273 (1928); State ex rel Hile v. City of Cleveland, 26 Ohio App. 265,
160 N. E. 241 (1927); Pierce v. Storms, 191 Okla. 410, 130 P. (2d) 523
(1942).
'City of Mobile v. Lartique, 23 Ala. App. 479, 127 So. 257 (1930).
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in order that it be proprietary in character: the mere fact that
some revenue is obtained is sufficient. 4 This factor is prob-
ably the greatest reason for holding the city liable. This is
true not only in airport cases but in other municipal enter-
prises. In Gensch v. City of Milwaukee,5 the court held a city
was not liable for the negligence of its employees in the operat-
ing of a free bathing beach, on the grounds that it was a gov-
ernmental function, rather than a revenue producing enter-
prise. Perhaps if an airport were operated on that basis the
same result could be reached. But conceding that part of the
operation of the airport is governmental, it still would not re-
lieve the city from liability if any part of its operation is revenue
producing. It has been held that when both governmental and
proprietary functions are carried on in the same enterprise,
the courts will not consider the distinction but regard the entire
operation as proprietary. 6
The next factor to be considered is the police power of the
city. There is a duty on the city to carry on enterprises which
concern the health, safety, welfare, and convenience of its
citizens. Because of this duty of the city, it has been exempt
from liability for torts in connection with services such as the
maintenance of policemen,7 firemen,8 schools, 9 and parks.10 It
may well be argued that airports are becoming so necessary to
public health and safety that there is a similar duty on the city
to supply such facilities. If this view can be accepted, then the
maintenance of a municipal airport should be considered a gov-
ernmental function, and therefore no liability should be im-
4 City of Chicago v. Selz, Schwab & Co., 202 Ill. 545, 67 N. E. 386
(1903); Duggan v. Peabody, 187 Mass. 349, 73 N. E. 206 (1905); Foss
v. City of Lansing, 237 Mich. 633, 212 N. W. 952 (1927); Morgan-
weck v. Egg Harbor City, 106 N. J. L. 141, 147 Atl. 468 (1929).
179 Wis. 95, 190 N. W. 843 (1922).
6Bellet ex. v. Pittsburg, 247 Pa. 185, 146 Atl. 567 (1929); Chris-
tan v. City of New London, 234 Wis. 123, 290 N. W. 621 (1940).
7 McIntosh v. City and County of Denver, 98 Colo. 43, 55 P. (2d)
1337 (1936); Aldrich v. Younston, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164
(1922).
8Connally v. City of Waco, 53 S. W. (2d) 313 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932).
'Ernst v. West Covington, 116 Ky. 850, 76 S. W. 1089 (1903);
Daniels v. Grand Rapids Board of Education, 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.
W. 23 (1916).
11 State ex rel Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa 553, 246 N. W. 390
(1933); Board of Park Com'rs of City of Louisville v. Prinz, 127 Ky.
460, 105 S. W. 948 (1907).
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posed on the city for the torts committed in its operation. Two
states, Iowa" and Georgia,12 have recently held that airports are
in the same category as public parks, apparently accepting the
above view.
Regulation of air traffic is another argument for placing
airports in this class of police regulation. The direction of
automobile traffic and street lights13 has been held to be gov-
ernmental. Although it is difficult to conceive at the present
time, it is possible that such regulation of airplanes will be a
duty of the city and the exercise of this duty would be as gov-
ermnental as the present day regulation of automobile traffic.
The courts throughout the several states which have had
the question of tort liability of a municipal airport placed
squarely before them, have decided the cases on one or more of
the above factors and the result has been a direct split of author-
ity. The majority, however, seem to hold a municipal airport
to be a proprietary or governmental function depending upon
whether or not the city is receiving revenue from its operation.'
4
Tennessee met the problem by passing a statute which states
that a municipal airport is a governmental function and
therefore there was no liability for negligence. This statute
was held to be constitutional in Stocker v. City of Nashville,'5
where it was contended that such a statute was an arbitrary
classification since it did not relieve other public utilities from
suit. A similar statute was held to be unconstitutional by a
Texas court in Christopler v. City of El Paso,"6 as violating the
equal protection clause of the 14th amendment of the Federal
Constitution.
" Abbott v. City of Des Moines, 230 Iowa 494, 298 N. W. 649
(1941) (Based on code provision)."Mayor, etc., of Savannah v. Lyon, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S. E.
63 (1936) (Based on code provision).
Dorminey v. City of Montgomery, 232 Ala. 47, 166 So. 689
(1936); Burd v. City of Atlanta, 52 Ga. App. 681, 184 S. E. 412 (1936).
"Pignet v. City of Santa Monica, 29 Cal. App. (2d) 286, 84 P.
(2d) 166 (1938); Peavy v. City of Miami, 146 Fla. 629, 150 So. (2d)
614 (1941); City of Blackwell v. Lee, 178 Okla. 338, 62 P. (2d) 1219
(1936); Mollencop v. City of Salem, 139 Ore. 137, 8 P. (2d) 783
(1932); Christopher v. City of El Paso, 98 S. W. (2d) 394 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936). Contra: Mayor, etc., of Savanah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App.
661, 189 S. E. 63 (1936); Abbott v. City of Des Moines, 230 Iowa 494,
298 N. W. 649 (1941); Stocker v. City of Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483,
126 S. W. (2d) 339 (1939).
174 Tenn. 483, 126 S. W. (2d) 339 (1936).
"98 S. W. (2d) 394 (Texas 1936).
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It would seem that state legislation is not the answer to
this problem. The courts' differences of opinion show that uni-
formity would not be reached. The more desirable result would
be to hold the municipality liable for torts for its negligent
acts; at least, until an increased local policing of airways be-
comes necessary. Although at present the people as a whole are
indirectly benefited by a municipal airport, it is, in reality, a
private business being conducted by a city and the city should
bear the burdens as well as the benefits therefrom.
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